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Collaborative robot safety is not determined by the robot alone. When a cobot shares a workspace with people, safe operation also depends on how the cell is designed and installed, the tasks workers perform, the reliability of safety systems, and the organization’s approach to training and risk management. A risk model developed around manufacturing in the Republic of Korea offers a structured way to examine how these factors interact.

Why collaborative applications need a broader safety view

Traditional industrial robots are commonly separated from workers by physical guards. Collaborative applications change that arrangement: safeguards may rely on monitoring, speed and separation controls, or other protective functions rather than complete isolation. That can make new production arrangements possible, but it also means a safety strategy must account for the complete work cell and the way people use it.

The analysis focused on two collaborative operation types: safety-monitored stop and speed and separation monitoring. In the first, the robot stops when a worker enters a defined area. In the second, the robot adjusts its speed as a person approaches. These approaches depend on appropriate sensing and control, as well as on correctly defined work areas. The study did not treat all collaborative applications as equivalent: hand guiding and power and force limiting have different operating principles and were outside its main focus.

Accident data for cobots was limited, so the analysis examined reported industrial robot injuries and fatalities in Korea from 2009 to 2018, alongside national workplace safety statistics. Those records provide context for possible hazards, but they do not amount to a direct measurement of cobot accident rates.

What industrial robot incidents reveal

In the injury records reviewed, crushing and collision accounted for the largest shares of incidents. Together, they represented roughly 88% of the recorded industrial robot injuries. The pattern points to the importance of preventing contact with moving robot components and workpieces, rather than assuming that a collaborative designation removes collision hazards.

Injuries were also associated with worker experience and task conditions. Nearly half of the recorded injuries involved workers with less than one year on the job. However, incidents also affected experienced workers, so tenure alone cannot be treated as a dependable safety control. Fatality records likewise included both newer and long-serving workers.

Maintenance and other non-routine work deserve particular attention. In the fatality cases analyzed, most occurred during repair, while others occurred during normal operation or cleaning. This makes safe isolation, clear procedures, and training relevant not only to production operators but also to maintenance personnel, programmers, and people who set up or relocate equipment.

The analysis also identified weaknesses in guarding and access controls in some fatal incidents involving conventional industrial robots. In collaborative cells, physical barriers may be replaced or supplemented by sensing and other protective measures. The practical lesson is not that virtual safeguards are automatically adequate, but that their design, installation, and function must be assessed as part of the complete system.

Using a Bayesian network to structure cobot risk

A Bayesian belief network represents relationships among uncertain factors and an outcome. In this model, contributing factors were grouped into human, organizational, and technical errors. Inputs included safety training, task type, risk assessment, installation quality, safety management, leadership attention to safety, company size, and system reliability. The model also considered two decisions: the number of cobots in a cell and whether safety certification at installation was implemented.

Because suitable data was not available for every relationship, some probabilities came from national statistics and incident analysis, while others were based on published material and stated assumptions. The calculation also used a naïve Bayes approach, which treats factors as independent when estimating certain conditional probabilities. These choices make the network useful for exploring how assumptions and inputs affect an estimate, but they limit how precisely its results can be applied to a particular plant.

For one cobot per work cell, the model estimated an annual accident probability of 0.66% without installation safety certification and 0.52% with it. For three cobots, the corresponding estimates were 1.54% and 1.37%. The one-cobot estimate without certification matched the average manufacturing accident rate used as the model’s Korean baseline for 2018. The study therefore characterized that modeled result as average-risky; it should not be read as a measured rate for cobots at a specific facility.

Where risk controls can have the greatest effect

Sensitivity analysis tested how changing individual inputs affected the modeled outcome while other conditions were held constant. System reliability produced the largest modeled change, but the analysis treated reliability mainly as a design and manufacturing consideration. For plant teams and integrators, the findings also point to controls that can be addressed during integration and operation:

  • Verify installation and safeguarding. Confirm that sensors, safety devices, cell layout, and protective zones match the intended design and applicable requirements. A safeguard that is incorrectly positioned or configured may not protect workers as intended.
  • Assess tasks and sequences. Evaluate the cobot, its control system, safety devices, and the actual work process. Reassess when tasks, layouts, or operating sequences change, rather than relying only on a static view of the equipment.
  • Prepare workers for routine and non-routine work. Training should address hazards such as collision and trapping, and should cover setup, programming, cleaning, repair, and other tasks beyond normal production.
  • Strengthen procedures and safety management. Clear responsibilities, effective supervision, and management commitment help make safety procedures part of daily work. For maintenance, procedures to prevent unexpected startup are particularly important.
  • Consider cell-level complexity. The model estimated higher accident probabilities as the number of cobots per cell increased. This supports evaluating the risks of the complete shared workspace, not just each robot in isolation.

Turning risk estimates into practical decisions

The model is best understood as a decision-support framework, not a substitute for a site-specific risk assessment. Its estimates depend on Korean data, assumptions about cobot conditions, and simplified relationships among factors. A facility should use its own equipment configuration, tasks, safeguards, and operating procedures to determine what hazards exist and what controls are needed.

For automation engineers and integrators, the central implication is to treat collaborative robot safety as a lifecycle responsibility. Reliable equipment matters, but so do installation quality, task-based risk assessment, workforce competence, and organizational follow-through. Considering these elements together helps teams make more informed decisions before commissioning a cobot cell—and revisit those decisions when the application changes.

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